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Abstract According to the experience property framework qualia are properties of
experiences the subject undergoing the experience is aware of. A phenomenologi-
cal argument against this framework is developed and a few mistakes invited by the
framework (concerning our understanding of consciousness, self-consciousness and
the relation of the two) are described. An alternative to the framework, the framework
of experiential properties (where experiential properties are properties of the experi-
encing subject) is presented and defended as preferable. It is argued that the choice
between these two frameworksmakes a substantial difference for theoretical purposes.
Keywords Qualia · Phenomenal consciousness · Self-consciousness · Experience
property framework · Experiential properties · Dualism
1 Introduction
The fact that there is something that it is like for the experiencing subject to undergo
an experience is commonly expressed by saying that experiences have qualitative
character. This is usually taken to imply that experiences have properties, so-called
qualia, which constitute what it is like to undergo the experience at issue.
This common framework, the experience property framework, will be challenged
in the present paper. It is a mistake, or so I will argue, to approach philosophical issues
about consciousness within this established paradigm. Experiences have ‘qualitative
character’ only in the sense that they involve an experiencing subject who instantiates
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experiential properties—properties such that there is something that it is like to have
them. Philosophical issues about consciousness should therefore be approached by
focussing on experiential properties and the status of those who can have them: expe-
riencing subjects. This framework, the framework of experiential properties, should
be chosen in order to avoid mistakes that are invited by the experience property frame-
work, or so I will argue in the present paper.
Most philosophers involved in this debate apparently tend to think that it does not
matter which of the two frameworks just mentioned one chooses for theorizing about
consciousness. But that choice, as will be argued in what follows, makes a substantial
difference. There is good reason to abandon the experience property framework in
favour the framework of experiential properties, or so I will argue.1
2 Experiences and experiential properties
Experiences are a subclass of events. Events may be understood as involving things
which instantiate properties. Subclasses of events can be distinguished by the kind of
individuals involved in the event and by the kind of properties they instantiate. The
subclass of experiences can be characterized by saying that the individuals involved are
experiencing subjects who instantiate experiential properties. For instance, your expe-
rience of blue in a givenmoment consists of you (an experiencing subject) instantiating
the experiential property of being phenomenally presented with blue. An analogous
account can be given for every experience.
In order to explain what distinguishes experiences from other events, one thus must
say what distinguishes experiential properties from other properties and experienc-
ing subjects from other individuals. Here I will focus on experiential properties. In
a first approximation, one may say that experiential properties are characterized by
the fact that there is something that it is like to instantiate them. But this charac-
terization covers too much. There is something that it is like to live in Switzerland,
since living in Switzerland is typically associated with visual experiences of particu-
lar landscapes, with feeling safe in daily life, etc. But living in Switzerland is not an
experiential property in the intuitive sense at issue; it does not by itself characterize
what it is like to have that property; it determines only indirectly what it is like for
a subject who has that property to live its present life. To exclude examples of this
kind one must say that to have an experiential property partially constitutes what it
1 The experience property framework is standardly used in the ongoing debate about consciousness.
Accordingly, qualia are introduced as qualitative properties of experiences or states (the difference does
not matter for the arguments of this paper) in various encyclopedia entrances, see for instance Byrne
(2004/2015), Kind (2008) and Tye (2015) and in many influential articles (e.g. Jackson 1982; Chalmers
2002). They are rarely introduced as properties of subjects (see for such an exception Carpintero 2003). It
is sometimes noted in passing that nothing of relevance for the author’s purposes depends on that choice
(see for instance Chalmers 2002, footnote 3). I am not aware of any explicit discussion in the literature of
whether or not anything substantial depends on the choice between qualia as properties of experiences (or
states) and qualia as properties of experiencers.
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is like for the subject who has the property at a given moment to live through that
moment.2
Most philosophers agree that experiences can be categorized into different phe-
nomenal kinds according to their phenomenal character. But how do we understand
what is constitutive for membership of an experience in a particular phenomenal kind
as opposed to another? The answer should be obvious. We understand what makes it
the case that an experience belongs to a specific phenomenal kind by understanding
which experiential property the subject involved instantiates and by understanding
what having that property amounts to. For instance, we understand what it is for an
experience to be a red experience on the basis of our understanding of what it is
for a subject to be phenomenally presented with red. Any phenomenal categorization
of experiences is based in this way conceptually and metaphysically on experiential
properties. Furthermore, to say that an experience has qualitative character at all is to
say that it is an event which involves the instantiation of some experiential property
or other. The notion of qualitative character is thus only understandable on the basis
of some prior understanding of what it is for a property to be experiential.
It follows that reflection about consciousness unavoidably involves reflection on
experiential properties. But experiential properties do not explicitly occur within the
experience property framework; they play their conceptual role only under the surface
in the way just described. Based on this observation one may formulate an argument
from conceptual and metaphysical priority against the experience property framework
which relies on a plausible general principle: if a given theoretical framework (a) uses
more fundamental concepts than another and if (b) the phenomena referred to by the
concepts of the former are more fundamental than the phenomena referred to by the
latter, then—other relevant aspects such as terminological simplicity being equal—it
is advisable to prefer the former framework.
The argument from conceptual and metaphysical priority will, however, convince
only few of those who are used since decades to the experience property framework.
Many of them will think that nothing substantial depends on the choice between the
two frameworks. Thinking so commits one to the claim that the following conditions
are all satisfied:
(1) Any claim which has intuitive appeal when formulated in one of the two frame-
works is as attractive, intuitively, when formulated in the other framework.
(2) Rational evaluation of an argumentwhen formulated in one of the two frameworks
leads to the same result as rational evaluation of the corresponding argument when
formulated within the other.
(3) Any claim that can be formulated in one of the two frameworks has a correspond-
ing formulation within the other framework.
(4) The two frameworks are equally adequate to the phenomena they conceptualize.
2 Philosophers used to the experience property framework may well accept this explication of what it is
to have an experiential property and yet add that having an experiential property is to be in a state or to
have an experience with qualia and conclude that the framework of experiential properties collapses into
the experience property framework after all. A detailed argument for the claim that no such explication of
experiential properties is available is developed in this paper (Sects. 3–12).
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If all these conditions were satisfied, then the two frameworks could be considered
to be equally acceptable dialects of one and the same theoretical language. The argu-
ment from conceptual and metaphysical priority would then have little weight. There
would be no strong reason to abandon the experience property framework. To the con-
trary, the fact that it has been used since decades would then be reason for going on
conceptualizing one’s thoughts within that framework and for communicating among
philosophers using its well-established terminology. However, the assumptions (1) to
(4) formulated above are in fact unfounded—as will be plain, I hope, by the end of
this paper.
3 A fallacious argument in favour of the experience property framework
Many find it natural to think within the experience property framework. This is
in part due to habit and also to the fact that common sentences used in natural
language (e.g. “this was a horrible experience”) appear to support it. But there is
perhaps a systematic explanation as well: a simple reasoning which may play a
role in the background of some people’s mind leads from uncontroversial assump-
tions directly into the experience property framework. One may reconstruct it as
follows:
(Premise P1) For an experience to have qualitative character means that there is
something that it is like for the experiencing subject concerned to undergo the
experience.
(P1)motivates a further premisewhich is (like P1) a partial explanation of the technical
term “qualitative character”:
(P2) The qualitative character of an experience constitutes what it is like for the
subject concerned to undergo that experience.
To arrive at the experience property framework, a further premise about ‘qualitative
character’ is required:
(P3) For an experience to have qualitative character is for it to instantiate qualitative
properties.
(P2) and (P3) imply:
(C)Certain qualitative properties of experiences constitutewhat it is like to undergo
a given experience.
To accept C is to adopt the experience property framework. If it is right, as
will be argued, that there are good reasons to abandon that paradigm, then
it is important to become clearly aware of where the above argument goes
wrong.
P1 should be read as a stipulation introducing the technical term “having qualita-
tive character”. We may assume that there is something that it is like for the subject
concerned to undergo an experience just in case that there is something that it is like
for the subject concerned to instantiate the properties the instantiation of which con-
stitutes the experience in question. It follows—presupposing the above explication of
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experiential properties—that P1 says nothing more than this: An experience has qual-
itative character just in case it consists in the instantiation of experiential properties by
a given subject. This is trivially true of all experiences (according to the explication
sketched), but this is just as it should be.
While P1 explicates the locution “to have qualitative character” P2 assumes that
it makes sense to talk of different qualitative characters for different experiences.
This may already appear to come close to attributing genuine qualitative properties to
experiences as such. But, in order to stick as close as possible to what we undoubtedly
understand well enough, P2 can and should be reinterpreted in a way which reduces,
like P1, to talk about experiential properties. According to P2, the specific qualitative
character of an experience constitutes what it is like for the experiencing subject to
undergo the experience. The ‘what it is like for the subject to undergo the experience’
is, as we know, constituted by the experiential properties instantiated by the subject
involved. It follows that the specific qualitative character of an experience is nothing
over and above the experiential properties instantiated by the subject concerned. Made
explicit in this way, P2 introduces the term “the qualitative character of an experience”
as short for those experiential properties the subject concerned instantiates in the
relevant event. There is no other acceptable interpretation of P2 available here, or so
I claim, since the ‘what it is like locution’ in order to be clearly understandable at all
must be ultimately understood on the basis of how it is for the subject concerned to
have the properties the instantiation of which constitute the experience at issue. So far
we have not made any step towards the experience property framework. But we ‘jump
into’ that framework by introducing premise P3.
Premise 3 states that for an experience to have qualitative character is for it to
instantiate qualitative properties. Given that ‘qualitative character’ has already been
introduced, by stipulation, through the premises P1 and P2, P3 requires an argument
based on the former premises. But there is no such argument in sight. According to P1,
for an experience to have qualitative character is for the experience to be an eventwhich
is constituted by the instantiation of some experiential properties by some subject. This
‘property’ of an event is not in any clear sense a qualitative property of the experience.
It is not a genuine ‘property’ of the experience at all; it need not be mentioned in
order to completely describe the relevant event. It suffices to say that the properties
instantiated by the subject involved in the event are of a certain type. According to P2
to have specific qualitative character is, for an experience, to involve a subject who
instantiates specific experiential properties. Therefore, to say of an experience that it
has a specific qualitative character is not to attribute a genuine property to the event
which is the experience; it is just a short way to say which experiential properties
are instantiated by the subject concerned. Therefore, neither P1 nor P2 can justify
P3. The impression that P1 and P2 motivate P3 turns out to be a cognitive illusion.
P3 is not even compatible with P1 and P2 given the way in which the content of P1
and P2 reduces to claims about experiential properties. The implicit argument people
may have in mind in favour of the experience property framework thus turns out to be
invalid. But to motivate the claim that the framework should be abandoned we need




4 The structure of a phenomenological argument against the experience
property framework
The aim of the phenomenological argument here to develop is to show that experiences
do not instantiate qualia in the technical sense of the term which is prevalent in the
debate about phenomenal consciousness and can be captured by the following claims:
Q1: Qualia are qualitative properties of experiences.
Q2: The qualia of an experience constitute what it is like for the experiencing
subject to undergo that experience.
Q3: While undergoing an experience the subject is in some primitive way imme-
diately aware of the qualia instantiated by the experience.
The aim of the argument whichwill be presented inwhat follows is not directed against
qualia in a different sense which is also present in the debate and often not clearly
distinguished from qualia in the technical sense just explained. Examples of qualia in
this other sense are colours, sounds, tastes or odours. This is a different use of the term.
These items are not properties of experiences, rather they belong to what is present to
the subject who undergoes the experience; they belong to its content. For qualia in this
sense the term “c-qualia” will be used in what follows. The argument developed in this
paper is not directed against the existence of c-qualia. Nor is the argument directed
against realism about phenomenal consciousness. I will use the term “qualia” in what
follows exclusively for the technical notion captured by the claims Q1–Q3. The aim
of the argument is to show that there are no qualia in that specific sense.
Q1 and Q2 are standard formulations when the technical term of qualia is intro-
duced.3 Q3, however, will be doubted by some philosophers moved by so-called
transparency of experience (see Sect. 18). And Q3 will be doubted with good reason
by those who limit the term awareness to something cognitively more demanding, to
something which requires some kind of reflection or conceptualisation. However, or
so one may argue, the idea that qualia are in some direct, immediate way (which does
not require reflection or conceptualisation) present to the subject undergoing the expe-
rience, is built into the very idea of qualia. Qualia are supposed to be in some sense
‘felt’ or ‘immediately there for the experiencer’ since they ‘directly’ determine how
it is to have the experience. The argument developed below is effective only against
those views which try to incorporate this intuition. But, I believe, most philosophers
who take the claim that experiences have qualia seriously and believe that it expresses
a puzzling fact which leads—at least prima facie—to trouble for physicalism do agree
with the intuitive idea expressed by Q3. Arguably, to abandon Q3 would be to lose
the intuitive motivation for introducing the technical term ‘qualia’ in the first place.
3 Qualia are introduced as qualitative properties of experiences or states (the difference does not matter
for the arguments of this paper) in encyclopedia entrances such as Byrne (2004/2015), Kind (2008) and
Tye (2015) and in many influential articles (e.g. Jackson 1982; Chalmers 2002). They are rarely introduced
as properties of subjects (see for such an exception Carpintero 2003). It is sometimes noted in passing that
nothing of relevance for the author’s purposes depends on that choice (see for instance Chalmers 2002,
footnote 3). I am not aware of any explicit discussion in the literature of whether or not anything substantial




To argue for the claim that we are not immediately aware in the relevant intuitive
sense at issue in Q3 of any properties fulfilling Q1 and Q2 I will proceed as follows. I
will distinguish three familiar ways in which one can be directly aware of the instan-
tiation of a property. I will then argue that in none of those ways we are ever aware
of properties fulfilling Q1 and Q2. Since no other ways of being immediately aware
of the instantiation of properties are in sight, one may conclude that no properties are
ever instantiated which fulfil Q1–Q3 simultaneously.
To answer the phenomenological argument just sketched and developed below the
opponent would have to show either (a) that—contrary to the arguments below—we
are aware of properties fulfilling Q1 and Q2 in one of the three ways at issue or (b)
that some further type of immediate awareness exists, that we are aware of qualia in
that further way and that the present phenomenological argument does not generalize
to that further type of immediate awareness. I doubt that any of these two strategies
can be convincingly carried out.
In preparation of the argument three candidates for immediate awareness of so-
called qualia will now be briefly presented in the following three short sections.
5 Immediate awareness in the sense of phenomenal presence
The clearest cases of phenomenal presence are episodes in which a subject is presented
with a c-quale like, for instance, a particular slightly reddish blue, the sound of a
violin, the smell of basil or the taste of ginger. It is not always the case that in being
phenomenally presented with a c-quale there is a corresponding property actually
instantiated in one’s environment. The sound of a violin as well as tastes and sounds
can be hallucinated. Nor is it necessarily the case that some property appears to be
instantiated in one’s environment when one is phenomenally presented with a c-quale.
For instance, a person can be phenomenally presented with red with her eyes closed
without thereby being under the impression that there is something around which
actually is red. The ontological status of what is phenomenally present raises puzzling
questions which however need not be addressed here. No answer to these questions
will be required for the argument to be developed.4
6 Immediate awareness in the sense of perceptual awareness
In perception we are aware of the properties of things around us in a way which
intuitively deserves to be called immediate. We seem to have direct access to certain
properties of things just by looking. The intuition of immediacy or directness here at
issue can be cashed out in various ways and there is no agreement among philosophers
about how it should be accounted for. Perhaps an important element concerns the way
we are related to the properties of things along the following lines: with respect to
certain properties things surrounding us cannot changewithout that change showing up
in how they appear to us. A certain sense of immediacy of perception can thus perhaps




be captured by saying that there is an appropriate counterfactual dependence between
how things are and how things appear when they are perceptually accessible to us.5
But these facts about our actual perceptual access to the properties of things cannot be
all there is to be said about the immediacy at issue. Perception also involves a certain
phenomenology of directness.We appear to have such direct access and so the question
arises what exactly appears to be the casewhen it seems to us that we have direct access
through perception to properties of real things in our environment. Perhaps we are
experientially aware of the counterfactual dependence mentioned before. Or perhaps
an adequate description of that particular perceptual phenomenology of directness
requires mentioning the apparent absence of inference or the apparent absence of
reason for doubt. No theoretical account of our so-called perceptual openness to the
world—as these intuitions about perceptual directness are sometimes expressed—will
be needed, however, for the argument to be developed below.6
7 Immediate awareness in the sense of primitive awareness
Many philosophers argue that there is a sense in which experiences are necessarily
conscious.7 I agree with this claim. The point can be put as follows: experiences are
such that, undergoing the experience necessarily involves that the subject is aware of
undergoing it. Let us call this kind of awareness primitive awareness. By stipulation,
primitive awareness refers to the kind of awareness for which the claim is true that, in
that particular sense of awareness, it is impossible to undergo an experience without
being aware of undergoing it.
Primitive awareness, understood in this way, is not the result of so-called intro-
spection or of phenomenal reflection (as I prefer to say for reasons that will become
clear below). To undergo an experience does not necessarily involve reflecting upon
it and so primitive awareness does not involve phenomenal reflection. Since primitive
awareness is arguably required for phenomenal reflection as a precondition primitive
awareness may be called pre-reflective. Primitive awareness does not require con-
ceptualizing the experience one undergoes but it is plausibly required for forming a
concept of a given experience on the basis of one’s own experience. Therefore it is apt
to call primitive awareness pre-conceptual.
8 An account of primitive awareness
Primitive awareness is thus a pre-reflective and pre-conceptual awareness of one’s
own experience such that it is impossible to undergo an experience without being
primitively aware of undergoing it. Two possibilities are left open when one accepts
5 This proposal is developed and defended in my paper (2011).
6 The intuition of ‘perceptual openness’ to the world and attempts at accounting for it is presented in detail
by Tim Crane in his encyclopedia entrance (2005/2011); for an epistemological account of this intuition
compare Soldati (2013).
7 A representationalist version of the thesis is famously defended by Brentano (1874) (compare the exposi-
tion of Brentano’s view in Soldati, forthcoming) and adopted in different versions by contemporary authors
(representationalist versions are developed e.g. in Levine 2006; Horgan and Kriegel 2007; Kriegel 2009). A
non-representationalist account is defended in various publications by Dan Zahavi, see e.g. his book (2014).
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the claim that experiencing and being primitively aware of experiencing cannot be
separated: (1) Primitive awareness of experiencing is something over and above expe-
riencing itself; these two different ‘aspects’ of a subject’s conscious life are however
correlated with necessity. (2) Primitive awareness of experiencing is nothing over and
above experiencing. Experiencing is already being primitively aware of experiencing.
Primitive awareness of experiencing is thus neither a part of experiencing nor anything
in addition to experiencing.
I here assume the second option.8 If the second option is correct, then there is a
way to say more simply what a subject is aware of when it is ‘aware of undergoing
a particular kind of experience’: A subject is aware of undergoing a particular kind
of experience when it is aware of having the corresponding experiential property. For
instance, to be aware of undergoing a red experience is to be aware of being phe-
nomenally presented with red. In general, when an experience consists in a subject’s
instantiation of experiential properties E, then a subject’s primitive awareness of the
experience is nothing more or else than the subject’s primitive awareness of instan-
tiating the experiential property E. Choosing the above second option (being aware
of experiencing is nothing over and above experiencing) we thus arrive at a further
way to characterize experiential properties. Experiential properties are those prop-
erties which cannot be instantiated by any individual without that individual being
pre-conceptually and pre-reflectively aware of instantiating them. In other words: to
have an experiential property is to be aware of having it.
This result may appear paradoxical. One is tempted to think that no property P can
be such that having P and being aware of having P is one and the same. But here it
helps to remember what experiential properties are: experiential properties are such
that, by their nature, the instantiation of such a property by a subject at a givenmoment
m partially constitutes what it is like for the subject to live through moment m. Now
there is an obvious and clear sense in which any subject is aware of what it is like for
it to live through moment m just by living through that moment. One may say that the
subject is immediately aware—without reflection and without conceptualization—of
every specific aspect of what it is like for it to live through moment m while it is living
though moment m. To admit this is already to admit what needs to be seen: given the
nature of experiential properties, to be aware of such an aspect is to be aware of having
the corresponding experiential property. This is why having an experiential property
just is being aware of having it.
The account of primitive awareness sketched in the present section will not be
presupposed in the phenomenological argument here to develop. Since the account
uses the framework of experiential properties it would arguably be question begging
to base an argument against the experience property framework on this particular
understanding of primitive awareness. This section serves to give some idea to the
reader of how the alternative to the experience property framework can be used for
theoretical purposes. The section will prove useful at the end of this paper (see Sect.
20 entitled “Concluding remark”).




9 Candidates for properties fulfilling Q1 and Q2
According to the experience property framework there are qualitative properties of
experiences (constraint Q1) which are constitutive of what it is like to undergo the
experience instantiating them (constraint Q2) and of which we are immediately aware
in undergoing the experience which has those properties (constraint Q3). To prepare
the argument against that claim let us see what properties of experiences can be said
to fulfill the first two constraints. To complete the argument it must then be shown that
these properties do not fulfill the third constraint (we are in not immediately aware of
them in any of the three senses explained while undergoing an experience instantiating
those properties).
It will suffice to search for properties fulfilling Q1 and Q2 for the example of
red experiences; it will be obvious how the result generalizes to other cases. So we
are searching for a qualitative property of red experiences which is constitutive of
what it is like to undergo a red experience. Put in this way it is not yet obvious
how one must proceed to find the answer. At this point it helps to remember that red
experiences form—as is quite generally agreed—a phenomenal kind. This assumption
can be restated as follows: what it is like to undergo a red experience is constitutive
for membership in the class of red experiences. It follows with constraint Q2 that
the property we are searching for coincides with the property which is constitutive
for membership in the class of red experiences. In order to find a property fulfilling
Q1 and Q2 we must therefore find the property of events which is constitutive of
membership in the class of red experiences. And this latter property is easy to find.
An event falls in the class of red experiences in virtue of the fact that it consists in
some experiencing subject being phenomenally presented with red. This is then the
property we are searching for: being an event such that the event consists in someone’s
instantiation of the relevant experiential property (in the case of red experiences: of
being phenomenally presented with red). Given the premises just used, this property
is the only property which fulfills Q2 and therefore the only candidate for ‘a quale’
common to red experiences in the technical sense here at issue. To simplify exposition
this property of red experiences will be called RE in what follows.
The argument could be finished quickly by saying that RE is not a qualitative
property and so does not fulfil Q1. But this argument would not be strong enough. The
opponent might be ready to abandon the claim that qualia are qualitative properties
or start a sophisticated debate about what it is for a property to be qualitative. A more
important and revealing objection against the experience property framework focusses
on Q3, the constraint of immediate awareness.
10 RE is not phenomenally presented
If red experiences have some quale (in the technical sense at issue) in common, then
that ‘quale’ is the property RE. This is the result of the preceding section. It follows that
every subject undergoing a red experience would have to be phenomenally presented




So we must ask: is RE phenomenally present to every subject who is phenomenally
presented with red? The answer is quite obviously negative. It is phenomenologically
obvious, or so I would like to claim, that no instantiation of the complex property RE
is ever phenomenally present to us and it is even more obvious that such presence is
not necessarily correlated to undergoing a red experience as it would have to be if the
claim at issue were correct. The argument to develop for the claim that phenomenal
presence is not an acceptable candidate for awareness of supposed qualia could simply
end here. But perhaps it is more helpful to dig a little deeper and to ask: why is it so
obvious that we are not phenomenally presented with RE in every red experience? In
other words: what makes the contrary thesis so obviously inadequate?
A plausible idea is to say that RE is not of the right kind for being phenomenally
presented. It is a complex property and properties which can be phenomenally pre-
sented to someone, so one might say, are simpler. But this does not quite capture the
crucial point. Mere complexity is not the problem. We are, for instance, capable of
being phenomenally presented with instantiations of three-dimensional shape prop-
erties which, when analyzed properly within mathematical terminology, are highly
complex too.
A second way to say why the thesis that RE is phenomenally present is phenom-
enologically inacceptable is to say this: the thesis requires that in every red experience
we are not only phenomenally presented with red, but also phenomenally presented
with a further property. A little phenomenological reflection, however, reveals, or so
one may argue, that there simply is no such further property phenomenally presented
to us alongside red in every experience of red. This is, in my view, as far as it goes, a
valid phenomenological argument against the thesis to reject.
A third ideawhich comes tomind is related to the unusual nature of the property RE.
RE is not, as one might express the thought, a genuine feature of experiences. Expe-
riences fall under the concept RE only in virtue of the fact that the subject involved
instantiates the corresponding experiential property (being presented with red). There
is no feature of the experience as such, so to speak, which could be phenomenally
presented since what makes the attribution of RE to a given experience correct is not
the instantiation of such a feature by the relevant event (the experience) but rather the
simple fact that the subject involved in the experience is presented with red. It follows,
or so one may argue, that being phenomenally presented with RE while undergoing a
red experience cannot be other than being phenomenally presented with the instanti-
ation of being oneself phenomenally presented with red. Let us be clear about what
that would mean. It does not just mean that in being phenomenally presented with red
we are also somehow aware of being presented with red which is a claim one should
not deny. Rather, it would mean that one’s own instantiation of being presented with
red would be phenomenally present to the subject which means it would be given to
the subject in the way in which redness and other c-qualia can be given in experience.
This sounds absurd. But why does it sound absurd?
The reason is, or so I suggest, that awareness of one’s own experiential properties
is not to be misunderstood as experiencing one’s own properties. Let me try to say
this more clearly. Every experience has a subject-object structure. In every experience
something is given to the experiencing subject even though that something need not
actually exist.Wemay call this feature of experiences basic intentionality. Basic inten-
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tionality does not consist in a relation between the subject and something else, since
what is presented might not be real and relations require the existence of the relevant
relata. One may say that basic intentionality is the metaphysical structure of every
experience. I cannot try to give a more theoretical account of basic intentionality here
but I trust it will be clear to the reader on the basis of examples what general feature
of experiences the term is meant to refer to.9
If our awareness of our own experiential properties were to be understood as experi-
encing the instantiation of those properties, then that awareness would have to exhibit
basic intentionality. The instantiation of one’s own experiential property would have
to be present as an additional object to the subject concerned. But this is obviously
not the case. In having a red experience, red is given ‘as an object’ in the relevant
sense. But one’s own instantiation of being presented with red does not occur as a
‘further object’ in the stream of consciousness. In other words: awareness of one’s
own experiential properties does not exhibit basic intentionality.10
On the basis of these reflection we may perhaps say briefly and more generally
what is wrong about the idea that RE is phenomenally present to the experiencing
subject undergoing a red experience: whatever the awareness of RE (in undergoing a
red experience) might amount to (if there is such an awareness at all) it certainly is not
an awareness exhibiting basic intentionality. The property RE does not show up as an
element in the stream of consciousness. But it would have to show up as an element in
the streamof consciousness if it was phenomenally present since phenomenal presence
does exhibit basic intentionality.
11 We are not perceptually aware of RE
Perceptions are experiences. They exhibit basic intentionality. This already excludes by
the same argument given for the case of phenomenal presence that we are perceptually
aware of the property RE. If wewere perceptually aware of RE, then RE would be given
to us in red experiences as a further object showing up in the stream of consciousness.
But a little phenomenal reflection reveals that this is not so. Therefore, we are not
perceptually aware of RE.
One might think that the argument sketched above is not required since there is
a simpler argument available: we are not perceptually aware of RE because we are
only perceptually aware of things revealed by the senses and instantiations of RE
by experiences are not revealed by the senses. But to argue in this way would be
to oversimplify the issue. It could be, after all, that conscious beings have what has
sometimes been called an ‘inner sense’ which allows them to track properties of inner
9 The concept of basic intentionality is introduced in greater detail in my paper (2014) and in Chap. 8 of
my book “Conscious Individuals” (in preparation).
10 This insight has been expressed by a number of philosophers in different ways across the history of
philosophy. In contemporary philosophy of mind it has been defended among others by Dan Zahavi (see e.g.
Zahavi 2014), by Charles Siewert who calls the pre-flective awareness here at issue of our own phenomenal




events. If this were so then our awareness of qualia would be sufficiently similar to
perception for being called perceptual awareness in the present context.
The idea that our awareness of the qualitative properties of our own experiences
is something like such an inner tracking is perhaps quite forcefully present in the
background of many people’s mind. The metaphor of such inner tracking which treats
awareness of so-called qualia in analogy to perceptual awareness is a bad metaphor,
however, and it leads to a distorted picture of phenomenal consciousness: themetaphor
of such ‘inner tracking’ would be adequate only if awareness of those ‘qualia’ had the
structure of basic intentionality. But as argued before, this is not the case.
12 Primitive awareness does not help
The last candidate for immediate awareness of qualia understood as properties of
experiences is primitive awareness. To complete the argument itwill suffice to show, for
the case of red experiences, that we are not primitively aware of RE when undergoing a
red experience or rather that we are only aware of RE in the sense that we are aware of
instantiating the relevant experiential property, being presented with red. Both results
are equally good for the present purposes. It does not matter in the context of an
argument against the experience property framework whether the only candidate for
a quale (RE, in our example) does not fulfill Q3 (we are not immediately aware of
it when undergoing a red experience) or whether the only sense in which we are
aware of that ‘quale’ in such an experience can be reduced to awareness of having the
relevant experiential property (to awareness of being phenomenally presented with
red).
According to the account of primitive awareness proposed in Sect. 8, we are only
primitively aware of our own present experiential properties. This assumption is part
of the framework of experiential properties which is an alternative to the framework
the argument is supposed to undermine. It would therefore be question begging to
use this assumption here. In the following argument for the claim that we are not
primitively aware of qualia (understood as properties of experiences) no particular
assumption about primitive awareness will be used beyond what has been stipulated
in order to introduce that notion: primitive awareness is the kind of awareness a subject
has necessarily of undergoing an experience while it undergoes the experience.
What remains to be shown in order to complete the argument (for the special case
of red experiences) is this: either we are not primitively aware of RE in undergoing a
red experience or to be primitively aware of RE is nothing but being aware of being
phenomenally presented with red. Given the way primitive awareness has been intro-
duced this amounts to showing the following: either (a) having a red experience does
not necessarily involve being aware of RE or (b) having a red experience necessarily
involves being aware of RE but the latter awareness reduces to being aware of being
phenomenally presented with red. In order to argue for this thesis we need to discuss
the following claim of necessity N:
N: Whenever a subject is phenomenally presented with red, then, necessarily, the
subject is aware of an instantiation of the property RE.
N turns into N′ when formulated more explicitly:
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N′: Whenever a subject is phenomenally presented with red, then, necessarily, the
subject is aware of there being an experience which is such that the subject involved
in it is presented with red.
Our aim is to show that N is either false or its consequence does not tell us anything
more than that the subject is aware of being phenomenally presented with red.
One might be tempted to reject N′ arguing that the description given of what the
subject is necessarily aware of is too complicated. I tend to think that this is an adequate
reaction. But let us assume, for the sake of argument, that N′ cannot be rejected for
that simple reason. Then the best strategy to reach the desired result is to show that,
for N′ to be acceptable, the awareness at issue of an instantiation of property RE must
be understood as being nothing over and above awareness of one’s own experiential
property of being presented with red. This can be done in two steps: (a) First one
argues that for N′ to be acceptable at all it must be interpreted as presupposing the
claim that every subject phenomenally presented with red is thereby aware of being
phenomenally presentedwith red. (b) Second one argues (on that basis) that N′ must be
interpreted as not attributing any further awareness to the subject beyond the subject’s
awareness of its own experiential property.
To take the first step of the argument (step (a) above), it is helpful to ask what
reason one might possibly have for accepting N′, that is for saying that any subject
phenomenally presented with red thereby necessarily is also aware of the occurrence
of some experience which involves a subject who is phenomenally presented with red.
Quite obviously the only plausible motivation for this claim is to say that a subject
who is phenomenally presented with red is thereby aware of the occurrence of an
experiencewith the relevant ‘property’ because it is aware of being itself phenomenally
presented with red. Obviously, the subject can have no other basis for being aware of
the occurrence of an experience which involves a subject who is presented with red,
than its awareness of being involved in such an experience, and that latter awareness
is awareness of being phenomenally presented with red. It follows that N′ is only
acceptable if one reads it as presupposing that a subjectwho is phenomenally presented
with red thereby is also necessarily aware of being phenomenally presented with red.
This completes the first step of the argument.
In order to see why N′ can only be accepted if awareness of RE is taken to reduce
to awareness of instantiating the relevant experiential property let us consider what
the opposite thesis would amount to. Given the result of the first step of the argument
just presented, to claim that such awareness does not reduce to awareness of being
phenomenally presented with red is to say that whenever a subject is phenomenally
presented with red then (a) it is aware of being phenomenally presented with red and
in addition to this (b) the subject is also aware of some experience occurring which is
such that the subject involved in it is phenomenally presented with red. In certain cases
it would be adequate to describe a subject’s situation by both (a) and (b). Here is such a
case: the subject at issue has acquired the general concept of being presented with red.
Therefore, whenever the subject is phenomenally presented with red the subject also
conceptualizes the experience it is presently undergoing as involving someone who
is phenomenally presented with red. But being phenomenally presented with red, or
so I presuppose here as uncontroversial, does not require having developed a concept
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of being phenomenally presented with red. Therefore, the interpretation of (b) just
sketched is not available to the opponent who wishes to defend N′.
The following hypothesis is highly plausible (I leave it to the opponent to prove
the opposite): on every interpretation of condition (b) which turns it into a condition
claiming more than (a), condition (b) is not necessarily fulfilled by a subject who is
phenomenally presented with red. If this is correct, then it follows that the necessity
claim here at issue (N resp. N′ above) is only acceptable if one interprets awareness of
RE as nothing over and above awareness of being phenomenally presented with red.
This completes this part of the argument.
All three candidates for immediate awareness of qualia (phenomenal presence,
perceptual awareness, primitive awareness) have now been considered. None of them
turned out to be the kind of awareness at issue when we are, as the experience property
framework suggests, aware of supposed qualia of experiences. So we could not find
properties fulfilling the constraints Q1, Q2 and Q3 simultaneously. It follows that the
experience property framework is unacceptable.
13 Experiences and brain processes
The argument developed in the preceding sections against the experience property
framework presupposes a particular account of what experiences are. It presupposes
that experiences are instantiations of experiential properties by experiencing subjects.
Perhaps the opponent could reply putting this assumption into doubt by saying some-
thing like this: experiences are inner processes. According to all we know today on
the basis of science, these inner processes cannot be other than neural processes in
the brain. It follows that the qualia of experiences (understood as properties of expe-
riences) are properties of brain processes. The property RE which has been assumed
to be the only candidate for a quale in the technical sense at issue is not a property of
brain processes. Therefore, the argument does not go through.
Various things should be said in response to this counterargument. First, the reply
suggests that experiences are “inner” in a literal sense of happening “inside the limits
of our body”. It is only on this assumption that science makes it highly plausible
that they cannot be other than neural processes happening in the brain. Now there
might be theoretical arguments for the view, as they have been developed by so-called
identity theorists, that experiences are brain processes and therefore something going
onwithin the limits of our body or brain. But putting thosematerialist arguments aside,
the assumption that experiences are inner events in the literal sense at issue does not
have any independent motivation. It seems to be quite common to think, however, that
there is phenomenological motivation for the claim that experiences literally happen
inside. This is probably due to the widespread thought that attending to what it is
like to undergo one’s present experience amounts to attending to some process which
appears to happen inside. The term “introspection” invites this idea. Reflection on
concrete examples reveals, however, that this is a mistake. We can attend to what it
is like to see a specific color on a given surface. We then attend to the surface and
its apparent color and thereby to what it is like to see that color. We are not then
under the impression of attending to some process which literally happens inside our
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brain or body. No such inner ongoing is phenomenally present in the first place as
something which happens inside. Directing one’s attention onto some such process
which appears to happen inside would however require that such an apparently inner
process is phenomenally present. One is perhaps easily misled by theoretical prejudice
into the assumption that phenomenal reflection involves an ‘apparent look towards
inside’ in the literal sense of ‘inside’. But a further factor may play a role: many test
their intuitions about experiences and our awareness of them using the example of
pain. And attending to how it is like to undergo one’s pain experience does, in typical
cases, involve attending to a process which seems to happen inside. For instance,
when while suffering from a head ache, a person attends to the qualitative character
of her experience, then she attends to a process which is apparently located inside his
or her head. But we need to carefully distinguish in such a case between the process
which apparently happens in the head (the object of the experience) and the experience
itself (the subject’s ‘experiential awareness’ of that process, the event consisting in
the phenomenal presence of that object to the subject). With this distinction in mind,
the idea that pain experience can be used to phenomenologically motivate the claim
that experiences happen inside reveals itself as based on confusion.
Second, one may wonder what a proponent of the counterargument presently under
consideration has to say about the thesis that experiences are instantiations of experien-
tial properties by experiencing subjects. Brain processes are instantiations of patterns
of neurological activities in groups of neurons. It will be quite uncontroversial that such
groups of neurons are not to be identified with experiencing subjects. So the identifi-
cation of instantiations of experiential properties by experiencing subjects with brain
processes is untenable. There are two ways in which the opponent might respond. A
first strategy is to deny that experiences are instantiations of experiential properties
by experiencing subjects. The second is to agree that experiences are instantiations of
experiential properties and to refine the thesis that experiences are also brain processes
along the following lines: experiences are those events which consist in the instan-
tiation of the property of the whole brain (or the whole body) to realize a particular
pattern of neural activation in a particular region. The first strategy is not convincing,
or so I would argue, since we understand what we wish to refer to using the term
“experiences” only by considering concrete examples and these examples are all of
the following kind: some subject instantiates some specific experiential property. The
second strategy is therefore the one the opponent should choose. What follows for the
counterargument under consideration?
An immediate consequence is that experiences are not (on that proposal) brain
processes after all since brain processes are realizations of patterns of neural activation
in regions of the brain. The counterargument must be refined accordingly. But this
does not change much or so it seems at first sight. The opponent must reformulate
the objection by saying something like this: experiences are instantiations of neural
properties of brains as a whole (or of biological organisms as a whole). The property
RE is not a property of such instantiations of neural properties by brains or organisms.
Therefore the argument does not go through.
But now a counter-objection to the counterargument at issue is readily available.
Since the opponent here under consideration accepts that experiences are also instan-
tiations of experiential properties by experiencing subjects the argument in its original
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form is not undermined at all. The property RE has been shown to be the only candidate
for a quale and the argument for this viewwas based on the assumption just mentioned
about the nature of experiences which the opponent here under consideration is ready
to concede. So the counterargument at issue collapses.
14 Supposed qualia of brain processes
The idea that experiences are brain processes is so common in the present debate
that the issue about phenomenal consciousness is often understood as concerning the
question aboutwhether or not brain processes have qualia (the eliminativist denies this)
or about whether or not those special properties of brain processes are physical or non-
physical in their metaphysical nature. A background assumption shared by many (not
only by materialists but also by dualists and philosophers who take the latter option
seriously) is this: experiences are inner events in the literal sense. Therefore it is quite
unproblematic to identify experiences with neural processes happening in the brain.
In the preceding section arguments have been given for the claim that—contrary to
what is often assumed—there is no phenomenological motivation available for the
view that experiences are spatially located within the limits of our bodies and a reply
to a counter-argument based on the identification of experiences with brain processes
has been given. It is therefore not necessary for the argument her presented against
the experience property framework to consider the option that qualia are properties of
brain processes. What has been said in Sect. 13 would suffice to justify putting this
option aside.
However, the contrary assumption (qualia, if they exist, are properties of brain
processes) is so widespread that it would not be wise to proceed in this manner. So
let us assume, for the sake of argument, that a version of the experience property
framework must be taken into account which combines the claims Q1–Q3 (qualia
are qualitative properties of experiences constituting what it is like to undergo an
experience and of which we are immediately aware when undergoing the relevant
experience) with the additional claim that experiences are brain processes.
The reformulation of the argument as directed against this version of the experience
property framework will not take much space here, however, since all steps of the
original argument have an obvious and equally convincing counterpart.
The first step in the reformulation at issue is to find the property corresponding toRE
in the original argument. To simplify exposition let us introduce a term for the class of
brain processes at issue and let us call them R-processes. It is agreed that R-processes
form a phenomenal class: for a brain process to belong to that class is for it to be
such that there is a specific way it is like to have a brain in which that process takes
place. That ‘specific way it is like’ is captured by saying that the subject concerned is
phenomenally presented with red. The essential commonality of R-processes can thus
be formulated like this: it is the property of a brain process consisting in the fact that
the subject concerned is phenomenally presented with red. “The subject concerned”
is used here to refer to the subject who has the brain in which the process takes place.
So now we have an account of the property RE′ which is constitutive for membership
in the class of R-processes. On the other side we know that the supposed quale typical
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for R-processes is what is assumed to be constitutive for membership in the class of
R-processes. It follows that RE′ is the only candidate for the supposed quale common
to all R-processes.
The parallel argument to be presented here must continue showing that we are
neither phenomenally, nor perceptually, nor primitively aware of RE′ or rather that
primitive awareness of RE′ , if it exists, reduces to being primitively aware of being
phenomenally presentedwith red. There is however no relevant difference between this
argument and the one already presented for the property RE. The most fundamental
objection against the idea that we are phenomenally or perceptually aware of RE′
is again that both, phenomenal awareness and perceptual awareness exhibit basic
intentionality. But again it is clear that the property RE′ does not occur as an element
in the stream of consciousness. Therefore awareness of RE′ cannot belong to a kind of
awareness which exhibits basic intentionality. It follows that phenomenal awareness
as well as perceptual awareness are excluded as candidates for the way in which we
are aware of the best candidate for the ‘quale’ of brain processes, of the property RE′ .
The argument concerningprimitive awarenessmust again be developed in two steps:
in a first step one realizes that the only plausible motivation for the claim that being
phenomenally presented with red necessarily involves awareness of an instantiation of
RE′ relies on the assumption that the person concerned is aware of being phenomenally
presented with red. In a second step one argues that no interpretation of “awareness
of RE′” can be given which satisfies two conditions: (a) on that reading the claim is
convincing that being phenomenally presentedwith red necessarily involves awareness
of RE′ and (b) on that interpretation awareness of RE′ is something over and above
awareness of being phenomenally presented with red. It follows from the result of the
second step that either we are not primitively aware of RE′ when undergoing a red
experience or that this awareness is nothing more than primitive awareness of being
phenomenally presented with red. This completes the present variant of the argument
which leads to the following result: there are no properties of brain processes fulfilling
Q1–Q3, so brain processes do not have qualia.
The arguments given so far for the claim that the experience property framework is
unacceptable are unlikely to impress anybody used to working within that framework
as long as it hasn’t been shown why and how the framework leads into serious errors.
I therefore briefly describe in what follows a number of mistakes that are invited by
that framework.11 These mistakes are all frequent and influential in the present debate
about consciousness. Sometimes they are quite explicitly expressed, sometimes they
influence the way people think ‘beneath the surface’.
15 Confusing different kinds of acquaintance
All familiar cases of acquaintance are what one might call cases of acquaintance
by presentation. Cases of acquaintance by presentation include those and only those
exampleswhere something is familiar to a subject on the basis of amental state or event
11 A deeper analysis of how the framework leads to these and other mistakes is presented in Chap. 2 of
my book (in preparation).
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which exhibits basic intentionality; in that case something is presented to the subject,
it occurs as an element in the stream of consciousness the subject is presented with.
We are acquainted, for instance, with people by being presented with them through
perception, we are acquainted with colours by being presented with them through
vision, perhaps we are acquainted with contents of thought by being presented with
those contents in theoretical reflection.
It may seem as if acquaintance always requires being presented or having been
presented with the item one is acquainted with. But there is an important exception:
acquaintance with experiential properties. We are acquainted with experiential prop-
erties by instantiating them. For instance, a subject is acquainted with how it is to be
phenomenally presented with red by being phenomenally presented with red. But no
instantiation of an experiential property is the object here of the subject’s experience.
No instantiation of ‘being phenomenally presented with red’ occurs as an item in the
stream of consciousness; no such instantiation of being phenomenally presented with
red is given to the subject as an object. Nor is there any process or ongoing (e.g. an
experience) given as an object to the subject in that case. It is not as if, in addition
to red, there also is an experience of red which somehow occurs as an object in the
subject’s stream of consciousness. The subject is aware of an experience of red when
being phenomenally presented with red; the subject is aware of the experience, as
we may say, which it is presently undergoing. But that awareness is not to be mis-
understood as exhibiting basic intentionality. The subject is acquainted with being
phenomenally presented with red by being primitively aware of being phenomenally
presented with red. Since primitive awareness does not exhibit basic intentionality,
acquaintance through primitive awareness is not a case of acquaintance through pre-
sentation. Acquaintance by primitive awareness is thus fundamentally different from
usual cases of acquaintance.12
Using the experience property framework one risks to be blinded for this fact.
The framework portrays acquaintance with different phenomenal kinds of experience
as being acquaintance with qualia. Since those qualia are understood as properties
of experiences (and thus as properties of some other entity than the subject itself)
the picture is forced upon the one who thinks within that framework that qualia are
presented to the subject at issue and that therefore the subject is acquainted with qualia
by presentation. The framework thus almost unavoidably leads to the fundamental
mistake of misinterpreting acquaintance with experiences on the basis of experience
as acquaintance by presentation. That mistake leads to further errors. Some of them
will be briefly presented in the following sections.
16 Phenomenal consciousness and self-awareness
Being aware of what it is like to have an experience by primitive awareness is to be
aware of instantiating an experiential property. It is not to be aware of an instantiation
of a property by something where that something is given as an object in the expe-
12 Acquaintance with oneself as a subject is likely to be the only other case of acquaintance which is not
acquaintance by presentation; compare my paper (2016) and Chap. 10 of my book (in preparation).
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rience or by someone whereby it is left open who that someone is; rather it is to be
aware of oneself instantiating the experiential property at issue. Primitive awareness of
experiential properties therefore comes along with some form of awareness of oneself,
with self-awareness in the specific sense of being aware of oneself.
Awareness of one’s experiential properties and self-awareness are thus intimately
related or rather, awareness of one’s own experiential properties is a form of awareness
of oneself. Being phenomenally conscious (which is nothing else than instantiating
experiential properties) involves being aware of having those experiential properties
(in the sense of primitive awareness) which in turn involves, as just said, being aware
of oneself. To be clear about this intimate relation between phenomenal conscious-
ness and self-awareness is crucial for developing an adequate theoretical account of
both, phenomenal consciousness and self-awareness. One might say that phenome-
nal consciousness and pre-reflective self-awareness are just two sides of one and the
same ‘phenomenon’. That intimate ‘relation’ becomes clearly visible, as just sketched,
within the framework of experiential properties. Contrary to this, the experience prop-
erty framework hides this intimate ‘relation’ and makes it difficult to even formulate
this important insight.
This disadvantage of the experience property framework is closely related to what
has been said in the preceding section about errors concerning acquaintance. Accord-
ing to the experience property framework we are acquainted with phenomenal kinds
of experiences by being presented with qualia. Awareness of being phenomenally pre-
sented with red is replaced, within that framework, by awareness of a quale common
to red experiences. Being presented with some such supposed qualitative item, how-
ever, does not in any obvious way involve or require being aware of oneself. Thinking
within that framework one thus loses sight of the close relation between phenomenal
consciousness and self-awareness. Once one adopts that way of thinking it becomes
difficult to see why and to say how phenomenal consciousness and pre-reflective self-
awareness are integrated into one another.
Some philosophers might concede that talk about awareness of qualia can be
reduced in the way proposed to talk about awareness of experiential properties and still
see no problem in continuing using the experience property framework. But this is not,
or so I claim, an advisable way to proceed. It is unhelpful to use a framework which
hides the important relation between phenomenal consciousness and self-awareness
‘under the surface’. It neither contributes to clarity of thought nor to the reliability of
intuition to use a language which must first be reduced to a more fundamental and
simpler language in order to render theoretically important insights accessible or evi-
dent. It is safer to work directly, in such a situation, with the more fundamental and
theoretically more transparent terminology.
17 Higher order theories of consciousness
According to so-called higher order theories of consciousness to be phenomenally
conscious is a matter of being aware of one’s own states. A central claim of such
theories is thus that there is no necessary link between a state having qualia and a
state being phenomenally conscious. This separation makes the view seem bizarre to
123
Synthese
many philosophers who take the problem about phenomenal consciousness seriously.
From their perspective to abandon the necessary link between qualia and phenomenal
consciousness is to change the subject; it is to use the term “qualia” in a different sense.
But the proponent of the higher order theory of consciousness takes the term qualia to
be a theoretical term the reference of which is fixed by the role qualia are supposed to
play in the explanation of behaviour.Under this presupposition the claim that qualia are
conscious has the status of a thesiswhich cannot be decided by reflection onwhat qualia
are but which requires an argument (supposedly an empirical argument). The friend
of necessarily conscious qualia will tend to be puzzled by such a proposal and insist
that to suppose that qualia can be phenomenally unconscious is to misunderstand the
term. That qualia are phenomenally conscious is not a substantial claim about qualia;
it is rather—given the way the term is intended to be understood—trivially true, or so
many philosophers would like to reply.
In this context it may be interesting to note that the claim that qualia are necessarily
phenomenally conscious comes out as trivially true when the claim is translated in
a plausible manner into the framework of experiential properties. On its intended
interpretation—at least as it is common among ‘friends’ of qualia—for a state to
have qualia is (expressed within the framework of experiential properties) for the
state to be such that the subject has experiential properties by being in that state.
This is the sense of “having qualia” that is perfectly acceptable and that philosophers
involved in this debate typically have in mind, or so I suggest. But for a state to be
phenomenally conscious is—according to common understanding—nothing else. I
cannot see any other adequate way to translate the latter locution into the language of
experiential properties but the one just proposed for the former locution. Translated
into the framework of experiential properties the two assertions “state S has qualia”
and “state S is phenomenally conscious” collapse into one and the same claim; they
must both be translated as follows: the subject involved in S has experiential properties
by being in state S. “States with qualia need not be phenomenally conscious” then
translates into “there are states S that fulfil both of the following conditions: (a) the
subject involved in S has experiential properties by being in S and (b) the subject
involved in S does not have any experiential property by being in S.” This claim is
of course trivially false.13 If this diagnosis is correct then one may conclude that the
prima facie plausibility that many see in higher order theories of consciousness is an
artefact of the experience property framework.
13 In response the opponent can argue against one of the two translations and/or reformulate the original
thesis with respect to experiential properties which would mean to insist that one can have experiential
properties without thereby being phenomenally conscious. Experiential properties however are, by stipu-
lation, such that instantiating them just is to be in a state with a specific phenomenology and therefore in
a state which is phenomenally conscious. Perhaps the proponent of the higher order theory of conscious-
ness must reply at this point that there is no reason to suppose that any genuine kind of properties can be
picked out by that stipulation. I would like to thank David Rosenthal for a conversation about these issues
at the APA in San Francisco in April 2016 which helped me a lot to understand the deeper disagreements
between the proponent of higher order theories of consciousness and philosophers who take it to be obvious
that qualia are phenomenally conscious. This brief section cannot do duty to the dialectic of the situation
which became clear in a beautiful manner in that conversation and which I would like to address in a more
satisfying manner on a different occasion.
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18 Transparency and attending to phenomenal character
What has been called ‘transparency of experience’ has many different interpreta-
tions.14 But we need not comment on these distinctions here. For the purposes of this
section wemay focus on one central idea concerning the direction of attention. Several
philosophers have pointed out that a subject who tries to attend to the phenomenal
character of its own experience will find itself attending to what is phenomenally
present in the experience. For instance, when a person tries to focus on what it is like
for her to see a tree, then she will focus on the rich variety of colours and shapes of
the tree she is looking at. Famously it has been concluded by various philosophers
that either there are no qualitative properties of experiences (no qualia) or that those
qualia cannot be attended to.15
Presupposing that awareness of what it is like to undergo an experience is, as
the experience property framework suggests, awareness of qualia in the technical
sense here at issue, it follows from the above result that we are not, in undergoing an
experience, aware of what it is like to undergo it. This is precisely the conclusion many
have drawn: based on the ‘transparency of experience’ in the sense just explained, it
is often argued that there is no reason to assume that experiences have qualitative
character or that there is something that it is like to undergo them or that there is no
reason to suppose that phenomenal consciousness raises any problem for physicalism.
In the context of this argument the experience property framework plays an unhappy
role in two related ways. First, it invites those who think in its terms to conflate two
distinct potential results of the argument. Second, and relatedly, it invites a misinter-
pretation of what the transparency of perception involves. The first mistake consists
in the failure to distinguish the following two claims C1 and C2:
C1: Experiences do not have qualia or we are never aware of those qualia.
C2: It is not true that there is something that it is like to undergo an experience
or, if there is something that it is like to undergo an experience, then we are never
aware of what it is like to undergo it.
According to the experience property framework C1 and C2 tell us exactly the same
since within that framework (a) for an experience to have qualia means that there is
something that it is like to undergo it and (b) for a subject to be aware of what it is
like to undergo an experience is for it to be aware of qualia. But, as argued before, this
identification is unacceptable and based on confusion. If the arguments here presented
go through, then C1 is true but C2 is false.
Here is the second way in which the experience property framework tends to lead
one astray when one reflects within it about transparency in the sense sketched above:
within a common version of that framework, to be aware of what it is like to undergo an
experience is understood as being presented with a quale instantiated by some internal
process. If this understanding were adequate, then one should indeed expect that a
person who succeeds attending to what it is like to see a tree either turns his or her
14 For different interpretations of transparency compare my paper (2007).
15 Forwell-knownversions of the argument seeHarman (1990) orMartin (2002) and for critical discussions
of this kind of argument compare Kind (2003), Siewert (2004) and my paper (2007).
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attention away from the tree in order to direct it ‘inside’ or simultaneously attends into
two opposite directions (to the tree outside there and to the quale instantiated ‘inside’).
But, obviously, neither the first, nor the second actually happens as a little reflection
reveals. We do not turn our attention away from the tree and its perceived properties
nor do we simultaneously attend into two different ‘directions’ when we try to focus
on what it is like to see a specific tree on a given occasion. For those who adopt the
framework at issue it seems to follow that any such attempt at focussing our attention
on what it is like to see a tree fails.
But of course the just mentioned conclusion is unfounded and the contrary impres-
sion is a cognitive illusion created by adopting the relevant version of the experience
property framework. Once one fully appreciates that to focus on what it is like to
undergo an experience is just to focus on what it is like to instantiate the experiential
property at issue, the above mentioned expectation reveals itself as clearly mistaken.
There is no reason to suppose that to focus ones attention on what it is like to be
phenomenally presented with red requires withdrawing attention from the thing one
sees as red. To the contrary, to gain a clear and vivid awareness of what it is like to be
phenomenally presented with red in perception requires that one focusses attention on
how the relevant surface appears which means to focus on the colour the surface out-
side there appears to have. Doing so one enhances one’s awareness of that particular
experiential property one presently instantiates compared to other experiential prop-
erties one instantiates simultaneously. And this is precisely the thing to do in order to
enhance one’s awareness of what it is like to have that particular experiential property.
Describing what happens when one focusses attention on what it is like to undergo
an experience in this way within the framework of experiential properties also reveals
why there is no double direction of attention involved when a subject focusses on
what it is like to undergo an experience. Focussing attention on what it is like to
undergo a given experience is a matter of voluntarily enhancing the salience of some
experiential property (as just described). This does not involve directing attention in
a particular direction in any clear sense. The metaphor of direction towards some
item in a supposed ‘inner’ realm is misleading. To enhance the salience of some
specific experiential property one presently instantiates is not to focus on something
given as happening ‘inside’ nor is it to focus on something occurring in the stream
of consciousness. Therefore, attending to the red outside there and attending to how
it is to see the red out there does not involve directing one’s attention in two distinct
directions.
Abandoning the experience property framework in favour of the framework of
experiential properties reveals in the way just sketched that the argument from trans-
parency briefly presented above is based on a false expectation: contrary to what is
suggested by the experience property framework, focussing on what it is like to see
a certain tree neither requires withdrawing one’s attention from the tree nor does it
require double direction of attention. Therefore, the transparency of perception in the
sense here at issue does nothing to undermine any of the following theses: there is
something that it is like to undergo perceptions; we are able to focus on what it is like
to undergo a perception; we are aware of what it is like to undergo perceptions while
undergoing them. The impression that transparency of perception undermines any of
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these claims is a cognitive illusion created by the experience property framework and
its misconception of phenomenal awareness as exhibiting basic intentionality.
19 Acquaintance by presentation and access to the nature of what one is
acquainted with
There is a difference between acquaintance by presentation and acquaintance by prim-
itive awareness which may be described, metaphorically, by saying something like
this: there is ‘a distance’ between the subject and what it is acquainted with in the case
of acquaintance by presentation; there is no such ‘distance’ in the case of acquain-
tance by primitive awareness. Intuitively it seems clear that whenever a subject is
acquainted with something by presentation, then the object it is thus acquainted with
may well have hidden sides which are not revealed to the subject by that kind of
acquaintance. Obviously this is so in the subcase of acquaintance by perception or
by thought (if there is acquaintance with contents by thinking about them) and it is
arguably so in typical cases of acquaintance by phenomenal presentation (e.g. with
colours, tastes or sounds). Being presented to someone ‘as an object’ of experience or
thought quite clearly opens up the possibility that ‘the object’ thus given, in whatever
way it might be ‘given’ to the subject, does not reveal its nature to the subject to whom
it is presented.
The situation is different for the case of acquaintance by primitive awareness.
Arguably, by being primitively aware of its own experiential properties the subject
stands in the closest possible relation to the properties it is thereby acquainted with.
There is, in a sense, no ‘distance’ between the subject and what it is acquainted with
in this special case.
Many aspect of the phenomenology of one’s own present state go unnoticed. It
may be difficult or even impossible to attend to one’s own experiential properties in a
way which makes the relevant phenomenal aspects of one’s present state more salient.
Attending to a specific voice in a piece of music and thereby attending to what it is like
to hear that voice may unavoidably change the experiential properties one instantiates.
Furthermore, there are many cases where it is difficult to tell what having the relevant
experiential property consists in. For instance, everybody is acquainted with being
under the impression of bringing about something in an active manner. But it is a
matter of dispute whether the nature of that experiential property can be accounted for
by a description of how it presents the world to be (by its intentional content) and if so
how that description would have to look like. So, being acquainted with experiential
properties by primitive awareness does not reveal the nature of those properties to
the experiencing subject in a way which renders their adequate theoretical descrip-
tion obvious. Nor is it excluded to be in error about the experiential properties one is
presently instantiating. Errors may be due to inadequate conceptualization or to a mis-
take in the formation of the relevant belief. What all this shows is that the subject who
is acquainted with experiential properties on the basis of experience thereby does not
have direct or infallible epistemic access to those properties. The subject’s epistemic




But primitive awareness is itself a kind of ‘access’ to those properties and it is this
access which can adequately be said to be direct and immediate and which may be
described as involving no ‘distance’ between the subject and what it is acquainted
with. The experiencing subject is aware, in the sense of primitive awareness, with
every aspect of the phenomenology of its overall present state. It is aware of every
such aspect just in virtue of the fact that such aspects are what they are: aspects of
what it is like for the subject to be in its present state. Experiential properties constitute
that over-all phenomenology and they are nothing over and above those ‘aspects’
of phenomenology. Therefore, to be aware in the sense of primitive awareness of
instantiating a certain experiential property is to be aware of that property’s very nature
in a pre-reflective and pre-conceptual way. Acquiring knowledge of that nature by the
formation of an adequate concept is a different matter. Primitive awareness of a given
experiential property is the basis of the formation of such a concept. If nothing goes
wrong—no misconception is involved and no mistake in the belief formation process
occurs—then it enables the subject to acquire an adequate and full understanding of
what having a certain experiential property consists in.
Adopting the experience property framework distorts our understanding of phe-
nomenal consciousness by misrepresenting the way in which we are aware of what
it is like to undergo our own experiences. It portrays awareness of our own experi-
ences as a matter of being presented with something and thereby makes it difficult
or impossible to understand the intimate relation in which the subject stands to its
own experiential properties. This inadequate picture leads to unreliable intuitions, or
so I would like to claim, when one engages in the evaluation of arguments for or
against physicalism. Anti-physicalist arguments implicitly or explicitly use the idea
that we have, as experiencing beings, a particular access to the nature of experience. As
just sketched, that particular access is however miss-described within the experience
property framework.16
20 Concluding remark
The examples given in the preceding sections illustrate that the experience property
framework and the framework of experiential properties are not just two variants of
one and the same theoretical language. It does matter which of the two frameworks
16 Nida-Rümelin (2006) and Goff (2011) both argue for the following claim: to have an experienced-based
concept (a so-called phenomenal concept) of an experiential property allows the subject at issue (under
ideal circumstances) to grasp (to fully understand) what having the relevant property consists in (this is the
thesis called phenomenal essentialism in Nida-Rümelin (2006), phenomenal concepts are, according to this
claim nature-revealing, they are transparent in the terminology of Philip Goff). In these two papers some
intuitive support is given for phenomenal essentialism but no explanation of how we gain such cognitive
access to the nature of these properties is proposed. The present section can be seen as a sketch of such
an explanatory account; the account is available only within the framework of experiential properties (it
does not seem to have an equally satisfactory counterpart when formulated within the experience property
framework). Phenomenal essentialism would of course gain additional support by an account of how a
subject can from a nature-revealing concept of an experiential property on the basis of his or her primitive
awareness of having the relevant experiential property. An elaborated version of such an explanation must
however be left to a different occasion.
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one chooses since none of the 4 conditions mentioned earlier in Sect. 2 are satisfied.
The examples given show that, to the contrary, the following claims (1′)–(4′) can be
justified:
(1′) A claim which has intuitive appeal when formulated in one of the two
frameworks is not always as attractive, intuitively, when formulated in the other
framework.
This is so, for instance, for the claim that phenomenal consciousness and pre-
reflective self-awareness are necessarily integrated, for the claim that the nature of
experiences is revealed in experience, for the claim that states with qualia need not
be phenomenally conscious and for claims about the consequences of so-called trans-
parency of perceptual experience. As argued before, intuition goes astray when the
experience property framework is used; intuitions that are invited by the framework
of experiential properties are more reliable.17
(2′) Rational evaluation of an argument when formulated in one of the two
frameworks does not always lead to the same result as rational evaluation of the
corresponding argument when formulated within the other.
One will come to different results in one’s rational evaluation, for instance, with
respect to the argument from transparency sketched above andwith respect to any anti-
physicalist argument based on the idea that experience provides access to the nature
of experience. Here again, as has been argued, the experience property framework
creates cognitive illusions and undermines reliable judgement.
(3′) Claims which can be formulated within one of the two frameworks do not
always have an adequate translation into the other framework.
For instance, there does not seem to be any satisfying way to translate what has
been said about primitive awareness in Sect. 8 into the language of the experience
property framework.
(4′) The two frameworks are not equally adequate to the phenomena they concep-
tualize.
If what has been said in this paper is correct, then the experience property
framework invites fundamentalmisunderstandingswith respect to consciousness, self-
consciousness and the relation of the two. To avoid these mistakes the experience
property framework should be abandoned in favour of the framework of experiential
properties.18
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17 This claim is closely related to claim (4′).
18 Chapter 2 of my book “Conscious Individuals. Sketch of a theory”, OUP, in preparation, discusses the
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